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On May 9–11, 2001, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago hosted its 37th annual
Conference on Bank Structure and Com-
petition. This year’s theme, “The Finan-
cial Safety Net: Costs, Benefits, and
Implications for Regulation,” focused
on the implications of the various explic-
it and implicit financial safety nets, rang-
ing from deposit insurance and subsidies
to government sponsored enterprises
(GSEs) to the notion that some financial
institutions are “too big to fail.” The tim-
ing of the conference was opportune in
light of the reform measures to the de-
posit insurance program introduced by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration in April 2001, the legislative un-
dercurrents concerning the proposed
new regulatory structures for the GSEs,
and the slowdown in economic activity
coupled with greater financial consoli-
dation resulting from the Gramm–Leach–
Bliley Act of 1999. This Chicago Fed Letter
summarizes some of the issues discussed
at the conference.
In his opening remarks to the conference
on Thursday, May 10, Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago President Michael
Moskow set the stage when he stated
that the “general public has a better un-
derstanding of the benefits than the costs”
of the financial safety net because of the
positive connotations the term conjures.
But, he suggested that “any thorough
discussion of the financial safety net
should include an analysis of both the
implicit and explicit guarantees, the
means by which those guarantees are
delivered, and the changes in behavior
resulting from those guarantees.”
Key questions that were addressed dur-
ing the conference include:
• Has the safety net expanded in recent
years? And how has market behavior
been altered as a result?
• How should we reform the deposit
insurance program to better protect
taxpayers from losses and to provide
equitable treatment among insured
depository institutions?
• What are the financial market distor-
tions emanating from a perceived or
actual too-big-to-fail doctrine?
• What are the implicit and explicit sub-
sidies to GSEs, and how should regu-
latory oversight be handled?
A special theme panel was selected to
address these issues, featuring Arthur J.
Murton, director, Division of Insurance,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC); Laurence H. Meyer, governor,
Federal Reserve System; Robert E. Litan,
vice president and director, economic
studies and Cabot Family Chair in Eco-
nomics, Brookings Institution; Kenneth
A. Guenther, president and CEO, Inde-
pendent Community Bankers of Amer-
ica; and Thomas H. Stanton, fellow,
Center for the Study of American Gov-
ernment, Johns Hopkins University. In
addition to the conference theme panel,
several other sessions provided presen-
tations on GSEs and federal deposit in-
surance reform.
In his keynote address to the conference,
Federal Reserve System Chairman Alan
Greenspan discussed the central issue
behind the explicit and implicit fea-
tures of the financial safety net. Although
the financial safety net has succeeded
in “eliminating bank runs, in assuaging
financial crises, and arguably in reduc-
ing the number and amplitude of eco-
nomic contractions in the past 60 years
… these benefits have come with a cost:
distortions in the price signals that are
used to allocate resources, induced ex-
cessive risk-taking, and, to limit the re-
sultant moral hazard, greater government
supervision and regulation.” To mini-
mize the marginal costs of the financial
safety net, Chairman Greenspan warned
that policymakers must be “very cautious
about purposefully or inadvertently ex-
tending the scope and reach of the safe-
ty net.”
Deposit insurance
The federal deposit insurance program
is clearly the most recognized component
of the financial safety net and has un-
doubtedly helped sustain the general
public’s confidence in the banking sys-
tem. Since its inception in 1933, it has
deterred liquidity panics, forestalled
bank runs, and avoided instability in
the economy.
This confidence, however, has not been
obtained without cost. It has long been
known that this feature of the safety net
induces moral hazard. Because of the
reality and perception that bank depos-
its are fully protected, banks are willing
to engage in riskier activities, insured
depositors are less willing and able to
monitor the activities of banks, and cred-
itors are less sensitive to the risks incurred
by banks. Therefore, it is imperative to
develop a system that appropriately prices
this insurance and the risks associated
with providing it.
Murton presented a brief overview of
the history of the FDIC insurance fund,
focusing on how insurance premiums
have changed over the years. The Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Improvement
Act (FDICIA) of 1991 required the FDIC
to maintain the insurance fund at 1.25%
of all insured deposits. It also directed
the FDIC to charge risk-based insurance
premiums. Many researchers believe that
the present system consistently under-
prices risk by restricting the FDIC’s flex-
ibility in setting premiums. The FDIC is
prohibited from charging premiums on
well-capitalized banks when the insurance
fund increases above the 1.25% reserve
ratio. The end result is that today, only
one bank in 20 pays deposit insurance
premiums.The first concern with the current ap-
proach is that premiums tend to be pro-
cyclical. Banks are required to pay high
premiums when the insurance fund ex-
periences losses in times of economic
distress. By diverting earnings to the in-
surance fund, these premiums would
reduce bank earnings at the worst time
and potentially restrain economic recov-
ery. Another deficiency in today’s depos-
it insurance system is that it does not
allow for a meaningful risk-based pricing
system. In good economic times most
banks do not pay premiums, while in
times of economic crisis, the FDIC will
not be able to differentiate between pre-
miums on distressed banks and well-per-
forming banks. Finally, the current
system provides an opportunity for
newly chartered banks to insure depos-
its without contributing to the insurance
fund. Yet, in times of economic crisis,
newly chartered banks are more likely
to fail.
Guenther argued that large financial
institutions such as Merrill Lynch and
Citigroup, are also “free riding” off of
the current insurance program. Because
Merrill Lynch owns two banks and
Citigroup’s Salomon Smith Barney owns
six banks, their brokerage units are able
to shift funds into accounts of federally
insured banks. He argued that in the
spring of this year, these financial insti-
tutions had moved about $85 billion
from their brokerage affiliates into their
bank subsidiaries without paying pre-
miums for the coverage.
Deposit insurance reform
Murton discussed the FDIC’s recommen-
dations for reforming the Deposit Insur-
ance Fund. First, he suggested that the
two funds, the Bank Insurance Fund
and the Savings Association Insurance
Fund, should merge. Although the two
funds provide the same product, they
set their insurance premiums separate-
ly. This dual insurance fund system in-
creases the possibility that banks and
savings institutions with the same level
and characteristics of risk may pay dif-
ferent insurance premiums, potentially
creating a misallocation of resources.
Second, the FDIC proposes indexing
insurance coverage to account for infla-
tion. It further proposes that every bank
be required to pay a premium every
year, while the FDIC would institute a
system of rebates and surcharges to
ensure that the insurance fund would
not become too large or small. The
FDIC’s ultimate goal is to reduce the
volatility of the insurance premiums by
spreading them “more evenly and equi-
tably across institutions.”
George Pennacchi, professor of finance
at the University of Illinois at Urbana–
Champaign, spoke in one of the Thurs-
day afternoon sessions in support of
the FDIC’s proposal to make deposit in-
surance premiums more equitable and
stable.1 The key to accomplishing this,
according to Pennacchi, is to view a
bank’s insurance coverage as “multiple
long-term contracts whose contract in-
tervals partially overlap.” The overlap-
ping feature of the agreement allows
the costs of insurance to be smoothed
out over time.
Of the proposed reforms, indexing in-
surance coverage to inflation appeared
to draw the greatest differences of opin-
ion. Coverage levels have not been in-
creased since 1980, while the overall price
level in the economy has approximately
doubled since that time. Guenther ar-
gued that neglecting to adjust for infla-
tion essentially “kills” a program that
has been essential to the stability of the
banking system. In his view, by refusing
to increase deposit insurance coverage,
policymakers discourage individuals
and corporations from using communi-
ty financial institutions and encourage
them to use large financial institutions,
thereby increasing systemic risk.
Opponents of increasing insurance cov-
erage argue that raising the ceiling from
$40,000 to $100,000 in 1980 contribut-
ed to the savings and loan crisis, due to
moral hazard. Litan noted that there is
no political support for such a change,
and from a consumer’s point of view, it
is unnecessary. He argued that people
have access to accounts at other banks
and, therefore, effectively have access
to unlimited deposit insurance. In addi-
tion, he argued that an increase is un-
necessary given the fact that the average
size of a bank account is around $10,000.
Too big to fail?
In his opening remarks to the confer-
ence, President Moskow said that “per-
haps the most controversial feature of
the safety net is the expectation that
large banks may be ‘too big to fail’.”
In order to avoid financial crises,
governments may be willing to bail out
financial institutions even without ex-
plicit guarantees.
The central question here is whether
uninsured depositors and non-deposit
creditors of large failed banks should
be required to incur losses. When
deemed necessary, uninsured deposi-
tors and creditors may be made whole
in order to prevent a mass flight by un-
insured depositors from a large troubled
bank. On that issue, Chairman Greenspan
stated, “If the government protects all
creditors, or is generally believed to
protect all creditors, the other efforts
to reduce the costs of the safety net will
be of little benefit.” Most analysts would
agree that government should strive to
avoid creating the perception that it
will bail out large financial institutions
so that uninsured bank creditors would
not have the expectation that some fi-
nancial institutions are too big to fail.
Guenther argued that the Federal Re-
serve, FDIC, and the Treasury have all
contributed to the notion that there is
an unspoken policy of “too big to fail”
and it is up to them to eliminate this
perception. As evidence, Guenther not-
ed that depositors at all major failing
banks have never been forced to incur
a loss on uninsured deposits. Many crit-
ics also point to the “systemic risk ex-
ception” embedded in FDICIA. For
example, under the “least cost require-
ment,” bank failure resolutions must be
made in such a manner that insured
depositors are made whole in a way that
is least costly to the insurance fund.
This provision puts uninsured deposi-
tors and other creditors at greater risk,
thereby encouraging them to monitor
the activities of banks. While this has
served to reduce moral hazard, least
cost resolution may be circumvented in
the event that such a resolution would
“have serious adverse effects on eco-
nomic conditions or financial stability.”
Critics maintain that this exemption
formally reinforces the notion of too
big to fail and undermines efforts to
reduce moral hazard.
Meyer, on the other hand, argued that
the effects of this exemption are over-
stated. In his view, the restrictions and
limitations on the use of this exemption
are adequate. In addition, the exemp-
tion does not require that uninsured
depositors or creditors be made whole.
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82 banks that failed between 1993 and
2000, uninsured depositors did indeed
suffer losses in almost three-quarters of
the resolutions.
Meyer added that policymakers can do
little to reduce the perception of too
big to fail other than to set the market’s
expectations by continuously reiterating
that there are no financial institutions
that can not be allowed to fail, regard-
less of size. But he conceded that, ulti-
mately, regulators and policymakers have
to perform in a manner that is consis-
tent with these assertions.
Managing banking failures
The nation’s last banking crisis during
the 1980s brought about reforms aimed
at addressing the unintended conse-
quences of the financial safety net. Most
adjustments tended to increase reliance
on market discipline. Chairman
Greenspan stressed the advantage of
the reforms as they attempt “to simulate
what markets alone might do, or at least
create market-type incentives.” He dis-
cussed the advantages of having banks
managed as if there were no safety net
present. The reforms, however, have
not been tested during a period of eco-
nomic distress.
Many of the participants agreed that one
approach to avoid a bail out is to ensure
a greater cushion of capital in financial
institutions through revised capital stan-
dards. As institutions encounter diffi-
culties, their losses would be absorbed
first by bank capital. Therefore, a strong
capital position is needed to deal with
unexpected losses and to provide a
countervailing force to moral hazard.
Currently, capital standards are being
revised under the Basel Committee, a
committee of regulators from 13 nations.
Litan argued that many flaws exist with
the proposed revisions. He noted that
they are incredibly and needlessly com-
plex, arbitrary, and do not rely sufficient-
ly on market discipline. Of particular
concern in the revisions, Litan said, was
the fact that they effectively lower the
largest banking organizations’ required
capital ratios. Responding to Litan’s com-
ments, Meyer acknowledged the com-
plexity of the proposed reforms, but
insisted that they reflect the reality that
large banking organizations engage in
a wide range of banking activities.
In Meyer’s view, the new Basel Accord
“should strike a better balance of re-
quirements versus recommendations.”
Although he agreed that certain items
such as capital ratios should be required
to be disclosed, he also supported ef-
forts to increase voluntary disclosure
of credit management, credit risk, and
trading positions at the largest and
more complex financial institutions.
Government sponsored enterprises
GSEs are special purpose corporations
chartered by Congress to carry out a
specific mission. Because many GSEs
are large, complex, and some would
argue, risky organizations, many ob-
servers believe that they should have
increased disclosure requirements and
additional regulatory oversight. Al-
though six GSEs exist, the conference
theme panel focused on the two larg-
est housing finance GSEs, Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac. Both of these insti-
tutions, along with the Federal Home
Loan Banks (FHLB), were created to
provide liquidity for the secondary mort-
gage market, thereby helping to enhance
the flow of funds to finance mortgages.
Because of their government sponsor-
ship and the perception among inves-
tors that the federal government will
not allow them to fail, Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac are able to borrow
money at lower cost than fully private
enterprises. They also benefit from tax
exemptions, security registration and
fee exemptions, and the ability to hold
emergency credit lines with the U.S.
Treasury. Stanton commented on the
lower capital required of GSEs compared
with the requirements for other insti-
tutions operating in the same market.
In his view, “the problem is that this sys-
tems rewards the firm with the most
favorable government charter, rather
than necessarily the most efficient firm.”
Stanton mentioned several factors that
make supervision of the GSEs difficult.
GSEs utilize their government subsidies
to grow rapidly, they wield strong po-
litical influence, and government
policymakers do not necessarily un-
derstand the complexities of the GSEs
or their charters.
While acknowledging that the two
housing GSEs benefit from their abili-
ty to borrow funds at a lower cost than
comparably situated private sector
borrowers, Alden Toevs, executive vice-
president of First Manhattan Consulting
Group, who spoke in a session on the im-
pact of GSEs on the underlying markets,
indicated that GSEs actually pass through
more benefits to mortgage borrowers
than they retain. That is, the average
homeowner receives substantial interest
savings through GSEs’ activities versus
the benefits that GSEs receive from their
government sponsorship. In this same
session, Wayne Passmore, an economist
at the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, presented a model sug-
gesting that, under certain conditions,
GSEs can lower mortgage rates for some
classes of borrowers. However, he ques-
tioned whether this is enough to justify
the existence of housing GSEs.
Later in the same session, Mark Vaughan,
an economist at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Saint Louis, suggested that the
FHLB’s advances (loans) to depository
institutions provide benefits by enhanc-
ing the flow of funds to the mortgage
market, but these benefits may come at
a cost. He expressed some concern about
the recent increase in the reliance of com-
mercial banks on FHLB funding. Accord-
ing to Vaughan, “access to advances
reduces the effectiveness of market disci-
pline in constraining bank risk-taking, and
deposit insurance premiums do not adjust
adequately to price the added risk.”
Some concern was also expressed that























































































































































































































grown so large that they may pose sys-
temic risk to the economy. “Whenever
large financial institutions become as
large as that, it’s reasonable that there
ought to be concern,“ said Meyer. But
many, including Meyer, are more con-
cerned about the “resource allocation
that comes from the subsidy… and how
it is growing over time.” As an example
of this resource misallocation, Stanton
pointed out that, “if we require a com-
mercial bank to back its residential mort-
gages with 4% capital, while requiring
much less capital for a GSE to hold the
same mortgage, we create a system of
regulatory arbitrage where it’s to the
advantage of both institutions to shift
mortgages to GSEs for funding.” Be-
cause banks tend to have greater prod-
uct diversification than mortgage GSEs,
this shift of residential mortgages could
potentially increase systemic risk. Stan-
ton concluded that as a result of the
differing charters between GSEs and
other financial institutions, “risk will
migrate to the place where the govern-
ment is least equipped to deal with it.”
Reform measures for GSEs
Because the government, in Stanton’s
view, has shown an inability to adequate-
ly regulate the GSEs, he concluded that
it needs an exit strategy. “We have creat-
ed a government sponsored monopoly
in the secondary mortgage market …
and the government does not display
significant ability to regulate either the
public costs or the public benefits.” The
main difficulty in any reform strategy is
convincing decision-making parties of
the costs and benefits of GSEs.
During his luncheon presentation on
Friday, May 11, Armando Falcon, Jr., di-
rector of the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight, the agency re-
sponsible for regulating mortgage
GSEs, indicated that market discipline
of GSEs’ risk-taking propensity should
not be seen as an adequate substitute
for formal government regulation. The
perceived implicit government guaran-
tee would impede the effectiveness of
relying on market discipline alone. In
addition, oversight is necessary because
the government has a stake in ensuring
that GSEs, created to support afford-
able housing, do not disrupt U.S. hous-
ing markets.
In his address to the conference, Con-
gressman Richard Baker, chairman of
the U.S. House Financial Services Sub-
committee on Capital Markets, Insur-
ance, and Government Sponsored
Enterprises, discussed pending legisla-
tion that would transfer regulatory au-
thority over Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac to the Federal Reserve System. Al-
though Congressman Baker recognized
that his proposal would need modifica-
tions, he explained that its main goal is
to create a regulatory structure that will
be credible in the eyes of the market. It
also seeks to enhance transparency and
market discipline as the growth and so-
phistication of the two largest GSEs in-
crease.
Conclusion
Continual reevaluation of the safety net
is important in a marketplace that is be-
coming increasingly complex through
technological innovation, globalization,
and increased financial sophistication.
Policymakers must recognize that safety
net reforms that extend its reach have
both benefits from increased industry
stability and costs from increased moral
hazard induced risk-taking and possible
resource misallocation. This delicate
trade-off must be given serious consid-
eration before introducing reforms.
This year’s Bank Structure Conference
brought out many different opinions
on how best to balance this trade-off
and how to move forward.
1In addition to the theme panel discussion,
the conference had several other presen-
tations highlighting the need to reform
federal deposit insurance. See Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago, 2001, The Finan-
cial Safety Net: Costs, Benefits, and Implica-
tions for Regulation, proceedings of the 37th
Annual Conference on Bank Structure
and Competition, forthcoming.